14 September, 2007

O’MEARA: Drieu on the Failure of the Third Reich

Posted by alex in Michael O'Meara at 12:46 pm | Permanent Link

Drieu on the Failure of the Third Reich

by Michael O’Meara

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE:  The powers threatening our people became hegemonic in May 1945, when the liberal-Communist coalition known as the “United Nations” imposed its dictatorship on defeated Germany. This dictatorship — whose defining characteristic, East and West, is its techno-economic worship of the Jewish Moloch — was subsequently imposed on the rest of Europe and, in the form of globalization, now holds the whole world in its grip. For white nationalists, the defeat of National Socialist Germany is both the pivotal event of the 20th century and the origin of their own movement. Opposing the powers which are one generation away from exterminating their race, white nationalists resume, in effect, the struggle of the defeated Germans. But they do so not uncritically.

As an idea and a movement, National Socialism (like Fascism) was a product of the late 19th-century political convergence that brought together elements from the revolutionary anti-liberal wing of the labor movement and elements from the revolutionary anti-liberal wing of the nationalist right.  Hitler’s NSDAP was the most imposing historical offshoot of this anti-liberal convergence, but one not always faithful to its origins — which bears on the fact
that Hitler shares at least part of the responsibility for the most devastating defeat ever experienced by the white race. 

It is not enough, then, for the present generation of white nationalists to honor his heroic resistance to the anti-Aryan forces.  Of greater need, it seems to me, is to identify and come to terms with his failings, for these, more than his triumphs, now weigh on our survival as a people.

The following is an excerpt from a piece that Pierre Drieu La Rochelle wrote in the dark days after August 1944, after the so-called “Liberation” of Paris and before the suicide that “saved” him from De Gaulle’s hangman.  It was written in haste, on the run, and never completed, but is nevertheless an illuminating examination of Hitler’s shortcomings (even where incorrect).

The central point of Drieu’s piece (and it should be remembered that he, like many of France’s most talented thinkers and artists, collaborated with the Germans in the hope of creating a new European order) is that Germany alone was no match for the combined powers of the British Empire, the United States, and the Soviet Union.  Only a Europe recast on the basis of National Socialist principles, he believed, could triumph against the Jew inspired coalition.   Hitler’s petty bourgeois nationalism, critiqued here by Drieu, prevented him from mobilizing the various national families of Europe in a common front, proving that his distillation of the anti-liberal project was inadequate to the great tasks facing the white man in this period.

*

From Drieu’s “NOTES SUR L’ALLEMAGNE:” 

I was shocked by the extreme political incompetence of the Germans in 1939, ’40, and ’41, after the victories [which made them Europe’s master].  It was in this period that their political failings sealed the fate of their future military defeat.

These failings seem even greater than those committed under Napoleon [in the period 1799-1815, when the French had mastered Europe]. The Germans obviously drew none of the lessons from the Napoleonic adventure.

Was German incompetence the incompetence of fascism in general?  This is the question.

The imbecilic maxim guiding Hitler was: “First, wage and win the war; then, reorganize Europe.”  This maxim contradicted all the lessons of history, all the teachings of Europe’s greatest statesmen, particularly those of the Germans, like Frederick and Bismarck.  It was Clausewitz who said war is only the extension of politics.

But even if one accepts Hitler’s maxim, the German dictator committed a number of military mistakes:

1. Why did he wait six months between the Polish campaign and the French campaign?

2. Why did he squander another ten months after the French campaign?

3. Why in late 1940 did he wage a futile aerial assault on England, instead of striking the British Empire at its most accessible point, Gibraltar?

After July 1940 [when no European power opposed him on the continent], he could have crossed Spain, destroyed the [English] naval base at Gibraltar, and closed off the Mediterranean.

The armistice with Pétain [which led to the establishment of the Vichy regime] was [another] German disaster.  If the French had followed [Paul] Reynaud [the last Premier of the Third Republic who advocated continued resistance from France’s North African colonies], the Germans would have been forced to do what was [militarily] necessary to win the war.  For once master of Gibraltar, Hitler would have rendered [the English base at] Malta useless, avoided the Italian folly in the Balkans [which doomed Operation Barbarosa in Russia], and assured the possibility of an immediate and relatively uncostly campaign against [English occupied] Egypt.  Rather than bombing London, he should, instead, have seized Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez.  This would have settled the peace in the Balkans, avoiding the exhausting occupations of Greece and Yugoslavia, [it would have cut England off from her overseas empire, and guaranteed Europe’s Middle Eastern energy sources].

These military failings followed from Hitler’s total lack of imagination outside of Germany.  He was [essentially] a German politician; good for Germany, but only there.  Lacking political culture, education, and a larger tradition, having never traveled, being a xenophobe like many popular demagogues, he did not possess an understanding of what was necessary to make his strategy and diplomacy work outside Germany.  All his dreams, all his talents, were devoted to winning the war of 1914, as if conditions [in 1940] were still those of 1914. . .  He thus underestimated Russian developments and totally ignored American power, which had already made itself felt in 1914.

He did understand the importance of the tank and the airplane [whose military possibility came into their own after 1918], but not in relationship to the enormous industrial potential of Russia and America. He neglected [the role of] artillery, which was a step back from 1916-1918.  He is least reproachable in his estimation of submarine warfare, whose significance was already evident in the Great War.  But even here, the Anglo-Saxons [i.e., the Anglo-Americans] deployed their maritime genius in a way difficult for a European continental to anticipate.

Hitler’s political errors [, however,]  were far worse and more thorough-going than his military errors.  He hardly comprehended the problem, seeing it in terms of 1914 — in terms of diplomacy, national states, cabinet politics, and [rival] chancelleries.  His understanding of Europe did not even measure up to that of old aristocrats like Bismarck and Wilhelm II, who never forgot the traditions of solidarity that united Europe’s dynasties, courts, and nobilities. . .

It is curious that this man who knew how to inspire the masses in his own country, who always maintained the closest contact with his people, never, not for a second, thought of extending his [successful] German policies to the rest of Europe.  He [simply] did not understand the necessity of forging a policy to address Europe domestically and not just internationally.  Diplomats and ambassadors had lost command of the stage — it was now in the hands of political leaders capable of winning the masses with the kind of social policies that had succeeded in Germany and could succeed elsewhere.

Hitler didn’t understand this.  After his armies invaded Poland, France, and elsewhere, he never thought of implementing the social and political practices that had worked in Germany . . .  He never thought of carrying out policies that would have forged bonds of solidarity between the occupied and the occupiers. . .

These failures lead me to suspect that the Germans’ political stupidity . . . owed something to fascism — that political and social system awkwardly situated between liberal democracy and Communist totalitarianism.

In the fascist system there was something of the “juste milieu” that could not but lead to the Germans’ miserable failure.  [A French term meaning a “golden mean” or a “happy medium,” “juste milieu” is historically associated with the moderate centrist politics (or anti-politics) of bourgeois constitutionalists — first exemplified by France’s July Monarchy (1830-48) and subsequently perfected in the American party system].

The Germans have no political tradition.  For centuries, most of them inhabited small principalities or cities where larger political forces had no part to play.  There was, however, Vienna and Berlin.  In these two capitals, politics was the province of a small [aristocratic] caste.  The events of 1918 [i.e., the liberal revolutions that led to the Weimar and Viennese republics] abruptly dislodged this caste, severing its ties from the new governing class.

Everything that has transpired in the last few years suggests that Germany remains what it was in the 18th century . . . a land unable to anchor its warrior virtues in politically sound principles . . .

[Part of this is due to the fact that] the German is no psychologist.  He is too much a theoretician, too intellectually speculative, for that.  He lacks psychology in the way a mathematician or metaphysician does.  German literature is rarely psychological; it develops ideas, not characters.  The sole German psychologist is Nietzsche [and] he was basically one of a kind. . .  Politically, the Germans [like the French] are less subtle and plastic than the English or the Russian, who have the best psychological literature and hence the best diplomacy and politics.

Hitler’s behavior reflected the backward state of German, and beyond that, European attitudes.  This son of an Austrian custom official inherited all the prejudices of his father’s generation (as had Napoleon).  And like every German nationalist of Austrian extraction, he had an unshakable respect for the German Army and the Prussian aristocracy.  Despite everything that disposed him against it, he remained the loyal Reichwehr agent he was in Munich [in 1919]. . . If he subsequently became a member of a socialist party [Anton Drexler’s German Workers’ Party] — of which he promptly became the leader — it was above all because this party was a nationalist one. Nationalism was always more important to him than socialism — even if his early years should have inclined him to think otherwise . . .

Like Mussolini, Hitler had no heartfelt commitment to socialism.  [Drieu refers here not to the Semitic socialism of Marx, with its materialism, collectivism, and internationalism, but rather to the older European tradition of corporate socialism, which privileges the needs of family, community, and nation over those of the economy] . . . That’s why he so readily sacrificed the [socialist] dynamism of his movement for the sake of what the Wehrmacht aristocracy and the barons of heavy industry were willing to concede.  He thought these alone would suffice in furnishing him with what was needed for his war of European conquest. . .

Fascism failed to organize Europe because it was essentially a system of the “juste milieu” — a system seeking a middle way between communism and capitalism. . .

Fascism failed because it did not become explicitly socialist.  The narrowness of its nationalist base prevented it from becoming a European socialism . . .  Action and reaction: On the one side, the weakness of Hitlerian and Mussolinian socialism prevented it from crossing national borders and becoming a European nationalism; on the other, the narrowness of Mussolinian and Hitlerian nationalism stifled its socialism, reducing it to a form of military statism. . .

Source: Pierre Drieu La Rochelle.  Textes retrouvées.
Paris: Eds. du Rocher, 1992.


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  7. 23 Responses to “O’MEARA: Drieu on the Failure of the Third Reich”

    1. Celtic Warrior Says:

      Another good article from O’Meara. However, the ‘theoreticians’ and arm-chair generals within the wider WN movement can debate ad infinitum all the policy and military mistakes committed during WW11 but such talk is of little help in our present situation.

      As O’Meara candidly states, the abyss of extinction is looming on the horizon. Our enemies seek to destroy everything of value, everything beautiful that we hold dear. Talk is not going to bring us victory.

      This summer I had the good fortune to visit friends in Australia and New Zealand. In both countries the White Race is well down the road to annihilation but the local people are unable or won’t see the seriousness of their situation. It is not defeatist pessimism to admit that presently our chances of victory in this raging war are less than 5%. We can only hope that the coming chaos works in our favor.

      So while our movement needs the perspective provided by writers such as O’Meara we also need people of action, uncompromising militants to take our cause to the streets and into the courts.

    2. Marwinsing Says:

      Despite his shortcomings (which we all know of anyway) Der Fuhrer still gets my stiffy. The man had balls… ugh sorry – he had a ball – upheaving the laissez-faire jerk-off politics of what Europe WAS – and still IS – today.

      Death to multi-cult Euro-Aryan race-traitors!
      Hang ’em high!

      Great post.

    3. NS CAT Says:

      The idea that hitler had just one ball is a jewish lie designed to discredit him.

    4. Hitler's Missing Nut Says:

      As the olde Deutsche saying goes:
      Too soon old
      Too late smart.

    5. Heather Blue Says:

      My folks who remembered Hitler admired him. At the same time they said the issues were about more than just Germany. They knew it involved all of us. I guess they could see, or sense, what was happening to America at that time under Roosevelt.

      But I think the Fuhrer had to rebuild Germany’s pride. The Jews had devastated the German’s sense of self esteem. Even a black Ape was cast as a figure to admire over them.

      We can never under estimate the value Hitler placed on race. Race was the essense of his greatness. Those who lived during that time and criticized him should be challenged. What were they doing? Where were they? If they understood something the Fuhrer did not, why didn’t they give him the benefit of their genius?

      Europeans will never willing accept a communist form of government. It can only be done through manipulation of the masses and put forth under the guise of something else. This is what we must overcome.

    6. Sgt. Skull Says:

      “3. Why in late 1940 did he wage a futile aerial assault on England, instead of striking the British Empire at its most accessible point, Gibraltar?”.

      The Germans launched retaliatory air raids against Britain which later came to be known as “The Battle of Britain”. Contrary to myth, Britain initiated the bombing campaign against German civilian centers. German fighters like the ME-109 did not have enough fuel to escort bombers across the English Channel and stick around for dog fights, thus the German air casualties for bombers were comparatively high. Had the German fighters been able to stay airborne longer they would have inflicted much heavier casualties on the Royal Air Force and industry around London.

    7. America First Says:

      Germany U Boat Codes were broken, that is a fact as you know.

      As well as code breaking on European Troop movements in fighting the forces of the USSR/NYC/London.

      Admiral Canaris and other traitor’s put a giant HURT on Europe defending OUR RACE.

      Itz that simple really as these were some of the worst cracks in the defense’s of Europe.

    8. America First Says:

      Sgt.Skull

      If you would please PM me from the forum if you please.

      Thanks

    9. New America Says:

      in reply to O’Meara on Drieu (1):

      Drieu on the Failure of the Third Reich

      by Michael O’Meara

      TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The powers threatening our people became hegemonic in May 1945, when the liberal-Communist coalition known as the “United Nations” imposed its dictatorship on defeated Germany. This dictatorship — whose defining characteristic, East and West, is its techno-economic worship of the Jewish Moloch — was subsequently imposed on the rest of Europe and, in the form of globalization, now holds the whole world in its grip. For white nationalists, the defeat of National Socialist Germany is both the pivotal event of the 20th century and the origin of their own movement. Opposing the powers which are one generation away from exterminating their race, white nationalists resume, in effect, the struggle of the defeated Germans. But they do so not uncritically.

      in reply:
      The idea that white nationalists are acting out “the struggle of the defeated Germans” is fascinating. We keep following the archaic Forms of yesterday, and refuse to accept the necessity of creating our own Forms that are appropriate to OUR Place, in OUR Time.

      Worse, just as the demonic Jews flooded post-War Germany with the black soldiers, who became privileged with the women who were conquered, and defeated, again, so, too, do the demonic Jews flood America with television and media images of soft, stupid, White males, and white women seeking the company, affections, and leadership of black men.

      In short, we, too, are being conquered culturally, without a shot being fired.

      This is our fault.

      Michael O’Meara wrote:
      As an idea and a movement, National Socialism (like Fascism) was a product of the late 19th-century political convergence that brought together elements from the revolutionary anti-liberal wing of the labor movement and elements from the revolutionary anti-liberal wing of the nationalist right. Hitler’s NSDAP was the most imposing historical offshoot of this anti-liberal convergence, but one not always faithful to its origins — which bears on the fact that Hitler shares at least part of the responsibility for the most devastating defeat ever experienced by the white race.

      in reply:
      If you read Fest’s biography of Hitler, you will be moved at how, when the young, newly-elected Chancellor landed at the airport, he was met by a crowd of people without confidence, who saw a future without hope, for themselves and their children. The young Chancellor began to speak, and the crowd was profoundly moved. This developed into a spiritual call-and-response, where it was as if the Gods of the Aryan Race were using the young Chancellor as their Voice to crystallize and define the hope and faith of a people, and inspire them with the confidence that they could be better, and they could do better. His Voice grew stronger, and spoke with greater clarity, greater certainty, and with faith in the Creative Powers of the people before him, and of the People they represented. Their love grew stronger, and their confidence grew with it. At the end of his impromptu speech, the people who met him were confident that THEY could solve their problems, and he would simply help remove the obstacles.

      Michael O’Meara wrote:
      It is not enough, then, for the present generation of white nationalists to honor his heroic resistance to the anti-Aryan forces. Of greater need, it seems to me, is to identify and come to terms with his failings, for these, more than his triumphs, now weigh on our survival as a people.

      in reply:
      Applying this model to the present state of affairs in America, let us never forget the Insight of Tom Metzger:

      All that we see that is wrong, all of the workings of the parasites, the demonic Jews, and their hirelings, the illegals and the goddamn niggers, is simply Nature taking its own course. WE chose to abandon the national (ie; Racial) expansion path, and WE abdicated our responsibility to not only defend all of the borders, both internal as well as external, but to push them back, conquering the wilderness in all of its manifestations. In short, the parasites are only doing what parasites do, and only because, if only by default, we allowed it.

      We have scorned the forces that allowed us to succeed; we must now suffer the triumph of the forces that rise in their absence.

      I have long felt that we refuse to identify our weaknesses in a manner that is positive in defining these AS weaknesses, and then work diligently to correct them.

      As a result, we personalize the failings and shortcomings of others, real or imagined, and in doing so (1) ignore the very real positive lessons they have offered us, while (2) using their imperfections as an excuse to avoid trying to do at least as well, for our Family and our Race, in our own lives.

      Michael O’Meara wrote:
      The following is an excerpt from a piece that Pierre Drieu La Rochelle wrote in the dark days after August 1944, after the so-called “Liberation” of Paris and before the suicide that “saved” him from De Gaulle’s hangman. It was written in haste, on the run, and never completed, but is nevertheless an illuminating examination of Hitler’s shortcomings (even where incorrect).

      The central point of Drieu’s piece (and it should be remembered that he, like many of France’s most talented thinkers and artists, collaborated with the Germans in the hope of creating a new European order) is that Germany alone was no match for the combined powers of the British Empire, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Only a Europe recast on the basis of National Socialist principles, he believed, could triumph against the Jew inspired coalition. Hitler’s petty bourgeois nationalism, critiqued here by Drieu, prevented him from mobilizing the various national families of Europe in a common front, proving that his distillation of the anti-liberal project was inadequate to the great tasks facing the white man in this period.

      in reply:
      I’ll comment on Drieu’s piece directly, but for the moment, a few observations:

      One, given the sheer magnitude of the challenges faced by Hitler in Germany, it is obvious that his first priority, his first RACIAL Duty, was to his own Nation.

      Two, he attempted to do a century’s worth of transformation – Cultural, Political, Economic – in less than a decade, WHILE dealing with a land war with Asia, directly, and the agents of the Asiatic Hive Consciousness, indirectly.

      Three, the “common front” that could have been formed with the “various national families of Europe” did not form as much from the shortcomings of the “various national families of Europe,” as anything else.

      If each of us would take the responsibility to do as much in our personal life, for our Families – the RACE, in microcosm – as Hitler did for the people of Germanic Europe who were ready to hear what he had to say, and creatively transform their lives, the lives of their Families, and, by extension, the lives of the RACE that was formed by their Families – in just one generation we would be the Light Unto The World we have been Called to Become.

      But, first, like Hitler, we must BE what we want the world to BECOME.

      A useful First Step is to send money, each and every month, to Alex Linder, whose address is on the top and bottom of this screen.

      The best Analytical Framework for this – the development of an American State based on Positive Racism in the framework of National Socialist principles – remains Harold Covington’s Northwest Republic, as defined in his Northwest Republic Trilogy.

      Part Two of Comments to follow.

      New America

      An Idea Whose Time Is HERE!

    10. Agis Says:

      O’Meara has had a few good essays in the past, but this one is the poorest by far. It is an unfortunate fact that English and American analysts are forced to rely on court historians and/or outright jews for their source material on WWII. Irving was one of the first that attempted to break this tradition by actually doing German archival work — but even he wasn’t able to completely escape the rampant falsifications and slander that pervades anything having to do with Hitler, NS or Fascism.

      So though this essays has a few observations worth noting, it is mostly rubbish.

      England and the United States should have never gotten into a war against Germany.

    11. jimbo Says:

      the common fallacy perpertrated by Driéu & others is that Hitler was some sort of demi-god in total and absolute control of the entire military situation!…this is, in fact, so far from the truth as to be laughable!

      most of the military mistakes are ‘down’ to Hitler’s in-competent generals; when-ever Hitler, a military genius, had any-thing like a reasonable control of the situation, the victories flowed non-stop!

      Hitler was also surronded by race-traitors & in-competents in the bureaucracy…..as the material @ the abv lnk will demonstrate!

      one of the biggest mistakes was the khyboshing of Röhm’s plans for the SA to replace most of the NCO/officer corps of the Wehrmacht!…again: that was not Hitler’s fault……the other mistake was the WaffenSS not being organised & up & running with @ least a million men before 1939!…..

      again: as i commented on the VNNf ‘thread’, the only mistake Hitler made was not funding/supporting fascist/National Socialist political move-ments in the UK & the USA!

    12. jimbo Says:

      wtf r my posts being ‘khy-boshed’ here again?…..the second one in as many days has not appeared!…..wtf GIVES?

    13. New America Says:

      Like jimbo, the first version of my response has appeared.

      In response to Agis, it is useful to recognize O’Meara is addressing foundational issues by citing the critique of another. How we choose to see, and define, those issues is up to us.

      In THIS reply, I have dealt with O’Meara’s Introduction.

      In a later reply, I shall deal with the substance of Drieu’s Critique.

      Drieu on the Failure of the Third Reich

      by Michael O’Meara

      TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The powers threatening our people became hegemonic in May 1945, when the liberal-Communist coalition known as the “United Nations” imposed its dictatorship on defeated Germany. This dictatorship — whose defining characteristic, East and West, is its techno-economic worship of the Jewish Moloch — was subsequently imposed on the rest of Europe and, in the form of globalization, now holds the whole world in its grip. For white nationalists, the defeat of National Socialist Germany is both the pivotal event of the 20th century and the origin of their own movement. Opposing the powers which are one generation away from exterminating their race, white nationalists resume, in effect, the struggle of the defeated Germans. But they do so not uncritically.

      in reply:
      The idea that white nationalists are acting out “the struggle of the defeated Germans” is fascinating. We keep following the archaic Forms of yesterday, and refuse to accept the necessity of creating our own Forms that are appropriate to OUR Place, in OUR Time.

      Worse, just as the demonic Jews flooded post-War Germany with the black soldiers, who became privileged with the women who were conquered, and defeated, again, so, too, do the demonic Jews flood America with television and media images of soft, stupid, White males, and white women seeking the company, affections, and leadership of black men.

      In short, we, too, are being conquered culturally, without a shot being fired.

      This is our fault.

      Michael O’Meara wrote:
      As an idea and a movement, National Socialism (like Fascism) was a product of the late 19th-century political convergence that brought together elements from the revolutionary anti-liberal wing of the labor movement and elements from the revolutionary anti-liberal wing of the nationalist right. Hitler’s NSDAP was the most imposing historical offshoot of this anti-liberal convergence, but one not always faithful to its origins — which bears on the fact that Hitler shares at least part of the responsibility for the most devastating defeat ever experienced by the white race.

      in reply:
      If you read Fest’s biography of Hitler, you will be moved at how, when the young, newly-elected Chancellor landed at the airport, he was met by a crowd of people without confidence, who saw a future without hope, for themselves and their children. The young Chancellor began to speak, and the crowd was profoundly moved. This developed into a spiritual call-and-response, where it was as if the Gods of the Aryan Race were using the young Chancellor as their Voice to crystallize and define the hope and faith of a people, and inspire them with the confidence that they could be better, and they could do better. His Voice grew stronger, and spoke with greater clarity, greater certainty, and with faith in the Creative Powers of the people before him, and of the People they represented. Their love grew stronger, and their confidence grew with it. At the end of his impromptu speech, the people who met him were confident that THEY could solve their problems, and he would simply help remove the obstacles.

      Michael O’Meara wrote:
      It is not enough, then, for the present generation of white nationalists to honor his heroic resistance to the anti-Aryan forces. Of greater need, it seems to me, is to identify and come to terms with his failings, for these, more than his triumphs, now weigh on our survival as a people.

      in reply:
      Applying this model to the present state of affairs in America, let us never forget the Insight of Tom Metzger:

      Metzger’s Insight:
      All that we see that is wrong, all of the workings of the parasites, the demonic Jews, and their hirelings, the illegals and the goddamn niggers, is simply Nature taking its own course. WE chose to abandon the national (ie; Racial) expansion path, and WE abdicated our responsibility to not only defend all of the borders, both internal as well as external, but to push them back, conquering the wilderness in all of its manifestations. In short, the parasites are only doing what parasites do, and only because, if only by default, we allowed it.

      We have scorned the forces that allowed us to succeed; we must now suffer the triumph of the forces that rise in their absence.

      I have long felt that we refuse to identify our weaknesses in a manner that is positive in defining these AS weaknesses, and then work diligently to correct them.

      As a result, we personalize the failings and shortcomings of others, real or imagined, and in doing so (1) ignore the very real positive lessons they have offered us, while (2) using their imperfections as an excuse to avoid trying to do at least as well, for our Family and our Race, in our own lives.

      Michael O’Meara wrote:
      The following is an excerpt from a piece that Pierre Drieu La Rochelle wrote in the dark days after August 1944, after the so-called “Liberation” of Paris and before the suicide that “saved” him from De Gaulle’s hangman. It was written in haste, on the run, and never completed, but is nevertheless an illuminating examination of Hitler’s shortcomings (even where incorrect).

      The central point of Drieu’s piece (and it should be remembered that he, like many of France’s most talented thinkers and artists, collaborated with the Germans in the hope of creating a new European order) is that Germany alone was no match for the combined powers of the British Empire, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Only a Europe recast on the basis of National Socialist principles, he believed, could triumph against the Jew inspired coalition. Hitler’s petty bourgeois nationalism, critiqued here by Drieu, prevented him from mobilizing the various national families of Europe in a common front, proving that his distillation of the anti-liberal project was inadequate to the great tasks facing the white man in this period.

      in reply:
      I’ll comment on Drieu’s piece directly, but for the moment, a few observations:

      One, given the sheer magnitude of the challenges faced by Hitler in Germany, it is obvious that his first priority, his first RACIAL Duty, was to his own Nation.

      Two, he attempted to do a century’s worth of transformation – Cultural, Political, Economic – in less than a decade, WHILE dealing with a land war with Asia, directly, and the agents of the Asiatic Hive Consciousness, indirectly.

      Three, the “common front” that could have been formed with the “various national families of Europe,” did not form as much from the shortcomings of the “various national families of Europe,” as anything else. By extending Metzger’s Insight to this, as well as our current situation, we see that the abdication of our sense of responsibility to our RACE, as the macrcosm of the Family, leads directly to the loss of power, the ability to be effective, in all other areas of society. This was true for the “various national families of Europe,” then, and is sadly true for us, now. This will remain the state of affairs unless adopt a Linder formulation: “Nothing goes Right, until WE go White,” and then DO SOMETHING about it.

      If each of us would take the responsibility to do as much in our personal life, for our Families – the RACE, in microcosm – as Hitler did for the people of Germanic Europe who were ready to hear what he had to say, and creatively transform their lives, the lives of their Families, and, by extension, the lives of the RACE that was formed by their Families – in just one generation we would be the Light Unto The World we have been Called to Become.

      But, first, like Hitler, we must BE what we want the world to BECOME.

      A useful First Step is to send money, each and every month, to Alex Linder, whose address is on the top and bottom of this screen.

      The best Analytical Framework for this – the development of an American State, as a Homeland for the White Nation, based on Positive Racism in the framework of National Socialist principles – remains Harold Covington’s Northwest Republic, as defined in his Northwest Republic Trilogy.

      New America

      An Idea Whose Time Is HERE!

    14. Nickle Beer Says:

      America First: “Germany U Boat Codes were broken, that is a fact as you know.”
      The standard history of the Enigma Code is that naval use, always by officers, was NEVER broken. Misuse by the Wehrmacht, out of exigencies of battle or otherwise, sending the same message cleartext and encrypted for example, provided the “handle” for codebreaking.

      I agree with Agis, La Rochelle’s surmises are mostly rubbish. The Gibraltar angle is interesting though. But, Chancellor Hitler, an Anglophile, was busy with almost obsequious diplomatic offers to the British at the time. (revealed relatively recently, BTW)

    15. Socrates Says:

      jimbo Says: “wtf r my posts being ‘khy-boshed’ here again?…..the second one in as many days has not appeared!…..wtf GIVES?”

      Some messages get caught in the filter – yours seem to be prone to that. Don’t know why. Try spell-checking all your words before posting, maybe that will help.

    16. Carpenter Says:

      Germany “lacked psychology” and “lacked political tradition,” being less sophisticated than the French and the British….

      That’s why he so readily sacrificed the [socialist] dynamism of his movement for the sake of what the Wehrmacht aristocracy and the barons of heavy industry were willing to concede.

      Yeah, like the NSDAP didn’t impose lots of rules and restrictions on production, crippling it with price controls just like anyone who doesn’t understand industry and thinks you can just decide prices with the stroke of a pen. At the end of the war, the leaders of the NSDAP had realized that the inflation-causing, industry-crippling price controls and fixed-production orders were their biggest domestic mistake.

      Fascism failed because it did not become explicitly socialist.

      Basically this essay says that if Hitler had hoisted the red flag and started singing the Internationale along with the Strassers, the workers in all lands would have admired him and joined his cause.

      I doubt it. But this Frenchman wouldn’t know these things as surely as he thought he did, with his on-the-ground view that lacked a greater perspective.

    17. jimbo Says:

      re-post:

      the common fallacy perpertrated by Driéu & others is that Hitler was some sort of demi-god in total and absolute control of the entire military situation!…this is, in fact, so far from the truth as to be laughable!

      most of the military mistakes are ‘down’ to Hitler’s in-competent generals; when-ever Hitler, a military genius, had any-thing like a reasonable control of the situation, the victories flowed non-stop!

      Hitler was also surronded by race-traitors & in-competents in the bureaucracy…..as the material @ the abv lnk will demonstrate!

      one of the biggest mistakes was the khyboshing of Röhm’s plans for the SA to replace most of the NCO/officer corps of the Wehrmacht!…again: that was not Hitler’s fault……the other mistake was the WaffenSS not being organised & up & running with @ least a million men before 1939!…..

      again: as i commented on the VNNf ‘thread’, the only mistake Hitler made was not funding/supporting fascist/National Socialist political move-ments in the UK & the USA!

    18. New America Says:

      The substance of Drieu’s commentary will be addressed in a following post. O’Meara deserves full marks for addressing an issue that encapsulates many of the shortcomings of White Nationalist thought, and practice.

      Drieu on the Failure of the Third Reich

      by Michael O’Meara

      TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The powers threatening our people became hegemonic in May 1945, when the liberal-Communist coalition known as the “United Nations” imposed its dictatorship on defeated Germany. This dictatorship — whose defining characteristic, East and West, is its techno-economic worship of the Jewish Moloch — was subsequently imposed on the rest of Europe and, in the form of globalization, now holds the whole world in its grip. For white nationalists, the defeat of National Socialist Germany is both the pivotal event of the 20th century and the origin of their own movement. Opposing the powers which are one generation away from exterminating their race, white nationalists resume, in effect, the struggle of the defeated Germans. But they do so not uncritically.

      in reply:
      The idea that white nationalists are acting out “the struggle of the defeated Germans” is fascinating. We keep following the archaic Forms of yesterday, and refuse to accept the necessity of creating our own Forms that are appropriate to OUR Place, in OUR Time.

      Worse, just as the demonic Jews flooded post-War Germany with the black soldiers, who became privileged with the women who were conquered, and defeated, again, so, too, do the demonic Jews flood America with television and media images of soft, stupid, White males, and white women seeking the company, affections, and leadership of black men.

      In short, we, too, are being conquered culturally, without a shot being fired.

      This is our fault.

      Michael O’Meara wrote:
      As an idea and a movement, National Socialism (like Fascism) was a product of the late 19th-century political convergence that brought together elements from the revolutionary anti-liberal wing of the labor movement and elements from the revolutionary anti-liberal wing of the nationalist right. Hitler’s NSDAP was the most imposing historical offshoot of this anti-liberal convergence, but one not always faithful to its origins — which bears on the fact that Hitler shares at least part of the responsibility for the most devastating defeat ever experienced by the white race.

      in reply:
      If you read Fest’s biography of Hitler, you will be moved at how, when the young, newly-elected Chancellor landed at the airport, he was met by a crowd of fearful people who were without confidence, who saw a future without hope, for themselves and their children. The young Chancellor began to speak, and the crowd was profoundly moved. This developed into a spiritual call-and-response, where it was as if the Gods of the Aryan Race were using the young Chancellor as their Voice to crystallize and define the hope and faith of a people, and inspire them with the confidence that they could be better, and they could do better. His Voice grew stronger, and spoke with greater clarity, greater certainty, and with faith in the Creative Powers of the people before him, and of the People they represented. Their love grew stronger, and their confidence grew with it. At the end of his impromptu speech, the people who met him were confident that THEY could solve their problems, and he would simply help remove the obstacles.

      Michael O’Meara wrote:
      It is not enough, then, for the present generation of white nationalists to honor his heroic resistance to the anti-Aryan forces. Of greater need, it seems to me, is to identify and come to terms with his failings, for these, more than his triumphs, now weigh on our survival as a people.

      in reply:
      Applying this model to the present state of affairs in America, let’s never forget Metzger’s Insight :

      All that we see that is wrong, all of the workings of the parasites, the demonic Jews, and their hirelings, the illegals and the goddamn niggers, is simply Nature taking its own course. WE chose to abandon the national (ie; Racial) expansion path, and WE abdicated our responsibility to not only defend all of the borders, both internal as well as external, but to push them back, conquering the wilderness in all of its manifestations. In short, the parasites are only doing what parasites do, and only because, if only by default, we allowed it.

      We have scorned the forces that allowed us to succeed; we must now suffer the triumph of the forces that rise in their absence.

      I have long felt that we refuse to identify our weaknesses in a manner that is positive in defining these AS weaknesses, and then work diligently to correct them.

      As a result, we personalize the failings and shortcomings of others, real or imagined, and in doing so (1) ignore the very real positive lessons they have offered us, while (2) using their imperfections as an excuse to avoid trying to do at least as well, for our Family and our Race, in our own lives.

      Michael O’Meara wrote:
      The following is an excerpt from a piece that Pierre Drieu La Rochelle wrote in the dark days after August 1944, after the so-called “Liberation” of Paris and before the suicide that “saved” him from De Gaulle’s hangman. It was written in haste, on the run, and never completed, but is nevertheless an illuminating examination of Hitler’s shortcomings (even where incorrect).

      The central point of Drieu’s piece (and it should be remembered that he, like many of France’s most talented thinkers and artists, collaborated with the Germans in the hope of creating a new European order) is that Germany alone was no match for the combined powers of the British Empire, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Only a Europe recast on the basis of National Socialist principles, he believed, could triumph against the Jew inspired coalition. Hitler’s petty bourgeois nationalism, critiqued here by Drieu, prevented him from mobilizing the various national families of Europe in a common front, proving that his distillation of the anti-liberal project was inadequate to the great tasks facing the white man in this period.

      in reply:
      I’ll comment on the substance of Drieu’s piece directly, but for the moment, a few observations:

      One, given the sheer magnitude of the challenges faced by Hitler in Germany, it is obvious that his first priority, his first RACIAL Duty, was to his own Nation.

      Two, he attempted to do a century’s worth of transformation – Cultural, Political, Economic – in less than a decade, WHILE dealing with a land war with Asia, directly, and the agents of the Asiatic Hive Consciousness, indirectly.

      Three, the “common front” that could have been formed with the “various national families of Europe,” did not form as much from the shortcomings of the “various national families of Europe,” as anything else. By extending Metzger’s Insight to this, as well as our current situation, we see that the abdication of our sense of responsibility to our RACE, as the macrcosm of the Family, leads directly to the loss of power, the ability to be effective, in all other areas of society. This was true for the “various national families of Europe,” then, and is sadly true for us, now. This will remain the state of affairs unless adopt a Linder formulation: “Nothing goes Right, until WE go White,” and then DO SOMETHING about it.

      If each of us would take the responsibility to do as much in our personal life, for our Families – the RACE, in microcosm – as Hitler did for the people of Germanic Europe who were ready to hear what he had to say, and creatively transform their lives, the lives of their Families, and, by extension, the lives of the RACE that was formed by their Families – in just one generation we would be the Light Unto The World we have been Called to Become.

      But, first, like Hitler, we must BE what we want the world to BECOME.

      A useful First Step is to send money, each and every month, to Alex Linder, whose address is on the top and bottom of this screen.

      The best Analytical Framework for this – the development of an American State, as a Homeland for the White Nation, based on Positive Racism in the framework of National Socialist principles – remains Harold Covington’s Northwest Republic, as defined in his Northwest Republic Trilogy.

      New America

      An Idea Whose Time Is HERE!

    19. Stu Gavin Says:

      I can’t believe how this essay is taking heavy criticism. It was written by a French Fascist who ended up losing his life because of the German defeat in WWII. If a dedicated Fascist hasn’t earned the right to discuss the positives and negatives in the political policies of Adolf Hitler then who has?

    20. New America Says:

      From Drieu’s “NOTES SUR L’ALLEMAGNE:”

      I was shocked by the extreme political incompetence of the Germans in 1939, ‘40, and ‘41, after the victories [which made them Europe’s master].*snip*

      Was German incompetence the incompetence of fascism in general? This is the question.

      The imbecilic maxim guiding Hitler was: “First, wage and win the war; then, reorganize Europe.” This maxim contradicted all the lessons of history, all the teachings of Europe’s greatest statesmen, particularly those of the Germans, like Frederick and Bismarck. It was Clausewitz who said war is only the extension of politics.

      in reply:
      “Europe” chose not to “reorganize” along NS lines, in part, I suspect, because Europe was still reeling from its “reorganization” following the devastating impact of World War I, and the devastating impact of the First Great Depression.

      In time, it seems, the brightest and Whitest of Europe – the Scandinavian countries – DID, in fact, reorganize their economies along NS lines, while maintaining the Constitutional Monarchy framework from democratic processes.

      Where would YOU rather live, today, if you were starting out with a family?

      Detroit, in the victorious USA?

      Birmingham, in the victorious UK?

      Or somewhere outside, say, Oslo?

      Thought so.

      Drieu wrote:
      But even if one accepts Hitler’s maxim, the German dictator committed a number of military mistakes:

      1. Why did he wait six months between the Polish campaign and the French campaign?

      2. Why did he squander another ten months after the French campaign?

      3. Why in late 1940 did he wage a futile aerial assault on England, instead of striking the British Empire at its most accessible point, Gibraltar?

      After July 1940 [when no European power opposed him on the continent], he could have crossed Spain, destroyed the [English] naval base at Gibraltar, and closed off the Mediterranean.

      The armistice with Pétain [which led to the establishment of the Vichy regime] was [another] German disaster. If the French had followed [Paul] Reynaud [the last Premier of the Third Republic who advocated continued resistance from France’s North African colonies], the Germans would have been forced to do what was [militarily] necessary to win the war. For once master of Gibraltar, Hitler would have rendered [the English base at] Malta useless, avoided the Italian folly in the Balkans [which doomed Operation Barbarosa in Russia], and assured the possibility of an immediate and relatively uncostly campaign against [English occupied] Egypt. Rather than bombing London, he should, instead, have seized Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez. This would have settled the peace in the Balkans, avoiding the exhausting occupations of Greece and Yugoslavia, [it would have cut England off from her overseas empire, and guaranteed Europe’s Middle Eastern energy sources].

      in reply:
      There is an entire body of alternative history dealing, in whole or in part, with these issues. (One of the most interesting is Robert Blumetti’s “The Lion Is Humbled.”) Factually, Manstein deals with many of these issues in his book, “Lost Victories.”

      Drieu wrote:
      These military failings followed from Hitler’s total lack of imagination outside of Germany. He was [essentially] a German politician; good for Germany, but only there. Lacking political culture, education, and a larger tradition, having never traveled, being a xenophobe like many popular demagogues, he did not possess an understanding of what was necessary to make his strategy and diplomacy work outside Germany. All his dreams, all his talents, were devoted to winning the war of 1914, as if conditions [in 1940] were still those of 1914. . . He thus underestimated Russian developments and totally ignored American power, which had already made itself felt in 1914.

      in reply:
      No, Hitler was fully aware of these developments. They were openly discussed in the news, after all. He knew that he could do precious little about them, at any rate, until the time came to do what he could, where he was. For those who accuse him of lacking political culture, education, and a larger tradition, I advise you read “Mein Kampf,” and “Hitler’s Table Talk,” as well as “My New Order.”

      Hitler, like the best of us, was an autodidact.

      Incidentally, he recognized the importance of the development of educational institutions that rewarded meritocratic work, and created the NAPOLA system. These allowed talented students, regardless of their socioeconomic position, to have access – for free – at the same type of school system, and to the same standards, used by the Junkers in educating their sons and daughters. A very good movie depicting some of this experience is “Beyond The Fall.” Just overlook the obligatory parts that disparage the NSDAP Cultural Moment.

      And, I suspect his dreams and talents went well beyond winning the war of 1914.

      I suspect they included defining the foundation for a European superstate, to support a European homeland.

      Incidentally, speaking of “underestimating Russian developments,” I suspect that meant the size of the Russian army. In fact, everyone did this. Suvorov discusses the immense unseen power of the reserve system of the Russian army, and how it created “new” regiments literally overnight. (It is useful to recall that Zhukov, a military genius, spent TWO FULL YEARS with von Seeckt, perhaps the foremost military mind of the first half of the Twentieth Century, if not the entire Twentieth Century.)

      Drieu wrote:
      He did understand the importance of the tank and the airplane [whose military possibility came into their own after 1918], but not in relationship to the enormous industrial potential of Russia and America. He neglected [the role of] artillery, which was a step back from 1916-1918. He is least reproachable in his estimation of submarine warfare, whose significance was already evident in the Great War. But even here, the Anglo-Saxons [i.e., the Anglo-Americans] deployed their maritime genius in a way difficult for a European continental to anticipate.

      in reply:
      The “enormous industrial potential of Russia and America” WAS “the enormous industrial potential of America,” and American financing, as well.

      Hitler did not underestimate them; he literally could not do anything about them, given the instant situation. Remember, Stalin was moving ahead with all possible power in the direction of turning all of Europe into a Jewish vassal state, under (demonic!) Jewish-Communist control.

      Drieu wrote:
      Hitler’s political errors [, however,] were far worse and more thorough-going than his military errors. He hardly comprehended the problem, seeing it in terms of 1914 — in terms of diplomacy, national states, cabinet politics, and [rival] chancelleries. His understanding of Europe did not even measure up to that of old aristocrats like Bismarck and Wilhelm II, who never forgot the traditions of solidarity that united Europe’s dynasties, courts, and nobilities. . .

      in reply:
      The “traditions of solidarity” pretty much went by the wayside following The Guns of August.

      They were replaced by the “traditions” of financial dictatorships, masked by the Forms of “democracy.”

      We all know how that worked out…

      Drieu wrote:
      It is curious that this man who knew how to inspire the masses in his own country, who always maintained the closest contact with his people, never, not for a second, thought of extending his [successful] German policies to the rest of Europe. He [simply] did not understand the necessity of forging a policy to address Europe domestically and not just internationally. Diplomats and ambassadors had lost command of the stage — it was now in the hands of political leaders capable of winning the masses with the kind of social policies that had succeeded in Germany and could succeed elsewhere.

      Hitler didn’t understand this. After his armies invaded Poland, France, and elsewhere, he never thought of implementing the social and political practices that had worked in Germany . . . He never thought of carrying out policies that would have forged bonds of solidarity between the occupied and the occupiers. . .

      in reply:
      In fact, Hitler recognized that his policies could be extended to the rest of Europe, when the peoples of those countries had grown to the point where they could implement them, as organic developments arising from the people organically.

      Placing the National Socialist principles that have worked so well in Scandinavia in, say, Zimbabwe, would be like placing orchids in the desert. The basic material needed to sustain them is absent; the raw material needed to inspire their further development is not only absent, it is reviled…

      Drieu wrote:
      These failures lead me to suspect that the Germans’ political stupidity . . . owed something to fascism — that political and social system awkwardly situated between liberal democracy and Communist totalitarianism.

      In the fascist system there was something of the “juste milieu” that could not but lead to the Germans’ miserable failure. [A French term meaning a “golden mean” or a “happy medium,” “juste milieu” is historically associated with the moderate centrist politics (or anti-politics) of bourgeois constitutionalists — first exemplified by France’s July Monarchy (1830-48) and subsequently perfected in the American party system].

      The Germans have no political tradition. For centuries, most of them inhabited small principalities or cities where larger political forces had no part to play. There was, however, Vienna and Berlin. In these two capitals, politics was the province of a small [aristocratic] caste. The events of 1918 [i.e., the liberal revolutions that led to the Weimar and Viennese republics] abruptly dislodged this caste, severing its ties from the new governing class.

      Everything that has transpired in the last few years suggests that Germany remains what it was in the 18th century . . . a land unable to anchor its warrior virtues in politically sound principles . . .

      in reply:
      At THIS point, Drieu’s on drugs.

      Hitler saw the problem was to meld the warrior virtues with the mindset of the revolutionary, in the sense that the revolutionary would ruthlessly discuss the archaic Forms and use the raw materials in the development of a new Substance, to meet the new needs of the new cultural moment.

      Thus, Guderian, Schact, Rommel, and Speer, plucked from the System precisely because of their willingness to adopt new measures with revolutionary ruthlessness, and remarkable effectiveness.

      Drieu wrote:
      [Part of this is due to the fact that] the German is no psychologist. He is too much a theoretician, too intellectually speculative, for that. He lacks psychology in the way a mathematician or metaphysician does. German literature is rarely psychological; it develops ideas, not characters. The sole German psychologist is Nietzsche [and] he was basically one of a kind. . . Politically, the Germans [like the French] are less subtle and plastic than the English or the Russian, who have the best psychological literature and hence the best diplomacy and politics.

      in reply:
      Goethe.

      And, as for the idea that “the English or the Russian, (who) have the best psychological literature,” well, we can see what good THAT has done them.

      To paraphrase Goethe, “More Goethe.”

      Drieu wrote:
      Hitler’s behavior reflected the backward state of German, and beyond that, European attitudes. This son of an Austrian custom official inherited all the prejudices of his father’s generation (as had Napoleon). And like every German nationalist of Austrian extraction, he had an unshakable respect for the German Army and the Prussian aristocracy. Despite everything that disposed him against it, he remained the loyal Reichwehr agent he was in Munich [in 1919]. . . If he subsequently became a member of a socialist party [Anton Drexler’s German Workers’ Party] — of which he promptly became the leader — it was above all because this party was a nationalist one. Nationalism was always more important to him than socialism — even if his early years should have inclined him to think otherwise . . .

      in reply:
      It is a matter of historical fact that Hitler’s “unshakable respect for the German Army and the Prussian Aristocracy” never fell to the level of unquestioning respect.

      His willingness to reorder all aspects of the Germany army, as needed, as well as the financial and industrial systems, made him a revolutionary of the first order.

      As well, we have mentioned how he took the masterful private education system of the Junkers, and made it available to the best German students, for free…

      Drieu wrote:
      Like Mussolini, Hitler had no heartfelt commitment to socialism. [Drieu refers here not to the Semitic socialism of Marx, with its materialism, collectivism, and internationalism, but rather to the older European tradition of corporate socialism, which privileges the needs of family, community, and nation over those of the economy] . . . That’s why he so readily sacrificed the [socialist] dynamism of his movement for the sake of what the Wehrmacht aristocracy and the barons of heavy industry were willing to concede. He thought these alone would suffice in furnishing him with what was needed for his war of European conquest. . .

      Fascism failed to organize Europe because it was essentially a system of the “juste milieu” — a system
      seeking a middle way between communism and capitalism. . .

      Fascism failed because it did not become explicitly socialist. The narrowness of its nationalist base prevented it from becoming a European socialism . . . Action and reaction: On the one side, the weakness of Hitlerian and Mussolinian socialism prevented it from crossing national borders and becoming a European nationalism; on the other, the narrowness of Mussolinian and Hitlerian nationalism stifled its socialism, reducing it to a form of military statism. . .

      Source: Pierre Drieu La Rochelle. Textes retrouvées.
      Paris: Eds. du Rocher, 1992.

      in reply:
      Hitler, ever aware of the power of Culture, and RACE as the Living Bridge between Family and Culture, had “heartfelt commitment(s)” to what was best for the German people. This went so far as not allowing women to work in the war industries, despite the handicap this placed on war-time productivity, because the foundation of family was the invisible well from which Culture drank. Incidentally, Spotts,” writing in “Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics,” observed that Hitler exempted artists from war-time service.

      Socialism, as Drieu seems to define it, failed, because it did not develop as an organic response of the Nation to the issues facing the RACE of that Nation.

      I would argue Socialism DID develop, organically, as an organic response OF the Nation to the issues facing the RACE of that Nation in the Nation-States that were the most advanced, as homes of the most advanced RACE, the Scandinavian nations, home of the White RACE.

      But THAT Socialism, was a true National Socialism.

      And, above all, remember that Hitler tried to do the work of the hundred years in ten, while fighting an all-front war against his implacable RACIAL Enemies.

      Imagine what he could have done if other had been the case.

      Now, imagine what WE could do, in the analytical framework of a Northwest Republic, as our RACIAL Homeland.

      New America

      An Idea Whose Time Is HERE!

    21. New America Says:

      in reply, part two:

      From Drieu’s “NOTES SUR L’ALLEMAGNE:”

      I was shocked by the extreme political incompetence of the Germans in 1939, ‘40, and ‘41, after the victories [which made them Europe’s master].*snip*

      Was German incompetence the incompetence of fascism in general? This is the question.

      The imbecilic maxim guiding Hitler was: “First, wage and win the war; then, reorganize Europe.” This maxim contradicted all the lessons of history, all the teachings of Europe’s greatest statesmen, particularly those of the Germans, like Frederick and Bismarck. It was Clausewitz who said war is only the extension of politics.

      in reply:
      “Europe” chose not to “reorganize” along NS lines, in part, I suspect, because Europe was still reeling from its “reorganization” following the devastating impact of World War 1, and the devastating impact of the First Great Depression.

      In time, it seems, the brightest and Whitest of Europe – the Scandinavian countries – DID, in fact, reorganize their economies along NS lines, while maintaining the Constitutional Monarchy framework from democratic processes.

      Where would YOU rather live, today, if you were starting out with a family?

      Detroit, in the victorious USA?

      Birmingham, in the victorious UK?

      Or somewhere outside, say, Oslo?

      Thought so.

      Drieu wrote:
      But even if one accepts Hitler’s maxim, the German dictator committed a number of military mistakes:

      1. Why did he wait six months between the Polish campaign and the French campaign?

      2. Why did he squander another ten months after the French campaign?

      3. Why in late 1940 did he wage a futile aerial assault on England, instead of striking the British Empire at its most accessible point, Gibraltar?

      After July 1940 [when no European power opposed him on the continent], he could have crossed Spain, destroyed the [English] naval base at Gibraltar, and closed off the Mediterranean.

      The armistice with Pétain [which led to the establishment of the Vichy regime] was [another] German disaster. If the French had followed [Paul] Reynaud [the last Premier of the Third Republic who advocated continued resistance from France’s North African colonies], the Germans would have been forced to do what was [militarily] necessary to win the war. For once master of Gibraltar, Hitler would have rendered [the English base at] Malta useless, avoided the Italian folly in the Balkans [which doomed Operation Barbarosa in Russia], and assured the possibility of an immediate and relatively uncostly campaign against [English occupied] Egypt. Rather than bombing London, he should, instead, have seized Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez. This would have settled the peace in the Balkans, avoiding the exhausting occupations of Greece and Yugoslavia, [it would have cut England off from her overseas empire, and guaranteed Europe’s Middle Eastern energy sources].

      in reply:
      There is an entire body of alternative history dealing, in whole or in part, with these issues. (One of the most interesting is Robert Blumetti’s “The Lion Is Humbled.”) Factually, Manstein deals with many of these issues in his book, “Lost Victories.”

      Drieu wrote:
      These military failings followed from Hitler’s total lack of imagination outside of Germany. He was [essentially] a German politician; good for Germany, but only there. Lacking political culture, education, and a larger tradition, having never traveled, being a xenophobe like many popular demagogues, he did not possess an understanding of what was necessary to make his strategy and diplomacy work outside Germany. All his dreams, all his talents, were devoted to winning the war of 1914, as if conditions [in 1940] were still those of 1914. . . He thus underestimated Russian developments and totally ignored American power, which had already made itself felt in 1914.

      in reply:
      No, Hitler was fully aware of these developments. They were openly discussed in the news, after all. He knew that he could do precious little about them, at any rate, until the time came to do what he could, where he was. For those who accuse him of lacking political culture, education, and a larger tradition, I advise you read “Mein Kampf,” and “Hitler’s Table Talk,” as well as “My New Order.”

      Hitler, like the best of us, was an autodidact.

      Incidentally, he recognized the importance of the development of educational institutions that rewarded meritocratic work, and created the NAPOLA system. These allowed talented students, regardless of their socioeconomic position, to have access – for free – at the same type of school system, and to the same standards, used by the Junkers in educating their sons and daughters. A very good movie depicting some of this experience is “Beyond The Fall.” Just overlook the obligatory parts that disparage the NSDAP Cultural Moment.

      And, I suspect his dreams and talents went well beyond winning the war of 1914.

      I suspect they included defining the foundation for a European superstate, to support a European homeland.

      Incidentally, speaking of “underestimating Russian developments,” I suspect that meant the size of the Russian army. In fact, everyone did this. Suvorov discusses the immense unseen power of the reserve system of the Russian army, and how it created “new” regiments literally overnight. (It is useful to recall that Zhukov, a military genius, spent TWO FULL YEARS with von Seeckt, perhaps the foremost military mind of the first half of the Twentieth Century, if not the entire Twentieth Century.)

      Drieu wrote:
      He did understand the importance of the tank and the airplane [whose military possibility came into their own after 1918], but not in relationship to the enormous industrial potential of Russia and America. He neglected [the role of] artillery, which was a step back from 1916-1918. He is least reproachable in his estimation of submarine warfare, whose significance was already evident in the Great War. But even here, the Anglo-Saxons [i.e., the Anglo-Americans] deployed their maritime genius in a way difficult for a European continental to anticipate.

      in reply:
      The “enormous industrial potential of Russia and America” WAS “the enormous industrial potential of America,” and American financing, as well.

      Hitler did not underestimate them; he literally could not do anything about them, given the instant situation. Remember, Stalin was moving ahead with all possible power in the direction of turning all of Europe into a Jewish vassal state, under (demonic!) Jewish-Communist control.

      Drieu wrote:
      Hitler’s political errors [, however,] were far worse and more thorough-going than his military errors. He hardly comprehended the problem, seeing it in terms of 1914 — in terms of diplomacy, national states, cabinet politics, and [rival] chancelleries. His understanding of Europe did not even measure up to that of old aristocrats like Bismarck and Wilhelm II, who never forgot the traditions of solidarity that united Europe’s dynasties, courts, and nobilities. . .

      in reply:
      The “traditions of solidarity” pretty much went by the wayside following The Guns of August.

      They were replaced by the “traditions” of financial dictatorships, masked by the Forms of “democracy.”

      We all know how that worked out…

      Drieu wrote:
      It is curious that this man who knew how to inspire the masses in his own country, who always maintained the closest contact with his people, never, not for a second, thought of extending his [successful] German policies to the rest of Europe. He [simply] did not understand the necessity of forging a policy to address Europe domestically and not just internationally. Diplomats and ambassadors had lost command of the stage — it was now in the hands of political leaders capable of winning the masses with the kind of social policies that had succeeded in Germany and could succeed elsewhere.

      Hitler didn’t understand this. After his armies invaded Poland, France, and elsewhere, he never thought of implementing the social and political practices that had worked in Germany . . . He never thought of carrying out policies that would have forged bonds of solidarity between the occupied and the occupiers. . .

      in reply:
      In fact, Hitler recognized that his policies could be extended to the rest of Europe, when the peoples of those countries had grown to the point where they could implement them, as organic developments arising from the people organically.

      Placing the National Socialist principles that have worked so well in Scandinavia in, say, Zimbabwe, would be like placing orchids in the desert. The basic material needed to sustain them is absent; the raw material needed to inspire their further development is not only absent, it is reviled…

      Drieu wrote:
      These failures lead me to suspect that the Germans’ political stupidity . . . owed something to fascism — that political and social system awkwardly situated between liberal democracy and Communist totalitarianism.

      In the fascist system there was something of the “juste milieu” that could not but lead to the Germans’ miserable failure. [A French term meaning a “golden mean” or a “happy medium,” “juste milieu” is historically associated with the moderate centrist politics (or anti-politics) of bourgeois constitutionalists — first exemplified by France’s July Monarchy (1830-48) and subsequently perfected in the American party system].

      The Germans have no political tradition. For centuries, most of them inhabited small principalities or cities where larger political forces had no part to play. There was, however, Vienna and Berlin. In these two capitals, politics was the province of a small [aristocratic] caste. The events of 1918 [i.e., the liberal revolutions that led to the Weimar and Viennese republics] abruptly dislodged this caste, severing its ties from the new governing class.

      Everything that has transpired in the last few years suggests that Germany remains what it was in the 18th century . . . a land unable to anchor its warrior virtues in politically sound principles . . .

      in reply:
      At THIS point, Drieu’s on drugs.

      Hitler saw the problem was to meld the warrior virtues with the mindset of the revolutionary, in the sense that the revolutionary would ruthlessly discuss the archaic Forms and use the raw materials in the development of a new Substance, to meet the new needs of the new cultural moment.

      Thus, Guderian, Schact, Rommel, and Speer, plucked from the System precisely because of their willingness to adopt new measures with revolutionary ruthlessness, and remarkable effectiveness.

      Drieu wrote:
      [Part of this is due to the fact that] the German is no psychologist. He is too much a theoretician, too intellectually speculative, for that. He lacks psychology in the way a mathematician or metaphysician does. German literature is rarely psychological; it develops ideas, not characters. The sole German psychologist is Nietzsche [and] he was basically one of a kind. . . Politically, the Germans [like the French] are less subtle and plastic than the English or the Russian, who have the best psychological literature and hence the best diplomacy and politics.

      in reply:
      Goethe.

      And, as for the idea that “the English or the Russian, (who) have the best psychological literature,” well, we can see what good THAT has done them.

      To paraphrase Goethe, “More Goethe.”

      Drieu wrote:
      Hitler’s behavior reflected the backward state of German, and beyond that, European attitudes. This son of an Austrian custom official inherited all the prejudices of his father’s generation (as had Napoleon). And like every German nationalist of Austrian extraction, he had an unshakable respect for the German Army and the Prussian aristocracy. Despite everything that disposed him against it, he remained the loyal Reichwehr agent he was in Munich [in 1919]. . . If he subsequently became a member of a socialist party [Anton Drexler’s German Workers’ Party] — of which he promptly became the leader — it was above all because this party was a nationalist one. Nationalism was always more important to him than socialism — even if his early years should have inclined him to think otherwise . . .

      in reply:
      It is a matter of historical fact that Hitler’s “unshakable respect for the German Army and the Prussian Aristocracy” never fell to the level of unquestioning respect.

      His willingness to reorder all aspects of the Germany army, as needed, as well as the financial and industrial systems, made him a revolutionary of the first order.

      As well, we have mentioned how he took the masterful private education system of the Junkers, and made it available to the best German students, for free…

      Drieu wrote:
      Like Mussolini, Hitler had no heartfelt commitment to socialism. [Drieu refers here not to the Semitic socialism of Marx, with its materialism, collectivism, and internationalism, but rather to the older European tradition of corporate socialism, which privileges the needs of family, community, and nation over those of the economy] . . . That’s why he so readily sacrificed the [socialist] dynamism of his movement for the sake of what the Wehrmacht aristocracy and the barons of heavy industry were willing to concede. He thought these alone would suffice in furnishing him with what was needed for his war of European conquest. . .

      Fascism failed to organize Europe because it was essentially a system of the “juste milieu” — a system
      seeking a middle way between communism and capitalism. . .

      Fascism failed because it did not become explicitly socialist. The narrowness of its nationalist base prevented it from becoming a European socialism . . . Action and reaction: On the one side, the weakness of Hitlerian and Mussolinian socialism prevented it from crossing national borders and becoming a European nationalism; on the other, the narrowness of Mussolinian and Hitlerian nationalism stifled its socialism, reducing it to a form of military statism. . .

      Source: Pierre Drieu La Rochelle. Textes retrouvées.
      Paris: Eds. du Rocher, 1992.

      in reply:
      Hitler, ever aware of the power of Culture, and RACE as the Living Bridge between Family and Culture, had “heartfelt commitment(s)” to what was best for the German people. This went so far as not allowing women to work in the war industries, despite the handicap this placed on war-time productivity, because the foundation of family was the invisible well from which Culture drank. Incidentally, Spotts,” writing in “Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics,” observed that Hitler exempted artists from war-time service.

      Socialism, as Drieu seems to define it, failed, because it did not develop as an organic response of the Nation to the issues facing the RACE of that Nation.

      I would argue Socialism DID develop, organically, as an organic response OF the Nation to the issues facing the RACE of that Nation in the Nation-States that were the most advanced, as homes of the most advanced RACE, the Scandinavian nations, home of the White RACE.

      But THAT Socialism, was a true National Socialism.

      And, above all, remember that Hitler tried to do the work of the hundred years in ten, while fighting an all-front war against his implacable RACIAL Enemies.

      Imagine what he could have done if other had been the case.

      Now, imagine what WE could do, in the analytical framework of a Northwest Republic, as our RACIAL Homeland.

      New America

      An Idea Whose Time Is HERE!

    22. New America Says:

      in reply to Stu Galvin:

      you wrote:
      >i>I can’t believe how this essay is taking heavy criticism. It was written by a French Fascist who ended up losing his life because of the German defeat in WWII. If a dedicated Fascist hasn’t earned the right to discuss the positives and negatives in the political policies of Adolf Hitler then who has?

      in reply:
      He has certainly “earned the right to discuss the positives and negatives in the political policies of Adolf Hitler,” and we have earned the right to discuss his discussion in light of history, and, equally important, our own resolution of such issues in the example of our own future.

      If you were French, and looked at the NSDAP entry into Paris as the beginning of transforming France into NSDAP France, then you would be very disappointed with how Hitler could not solve your problems for you.

      On the other hand, as I understand it, France was pretty well divided internally, and the French cound have split the country into a soft, tranquil region, and a modern, industrial region. They could even have made it into separate countries.

      They didn’t.

      The results of that are upon them.

      Them, and us.

      The issue for us is to learn from this experience, and apply it to our own national future, as best we can.

      We can not adopt the Forms of NSDAP Germany in what America has become.

      We can adopt the Substance that allowed a defeat, bankrupt nation to transform itself into the heart of Western Civilization literally overnight.

      That Substance involves the change of Mind, that will save our kind.

      An excellent place to begin is where the young Chancellor began; Family, as the microcosm of RACE, and RACE as the Living Bridge between Family and Culture.

      Sending money to Alex Linder each and every month would not hurt, either.

      New America

      An Idea Whose Time Is HERE!

    23. New America Says:

      in reply, part two:

      From Drieu’s “NOTES SUR L’ALLEMAGNE:”

      I was shocked by the extreme political incompetence of the Germans in 1939, ‘40, and ‘41, after the victories [which made them Europe’s master].*snip*

      Was German incompetence the incompetence of fascism in general? This is the question.

      The imbecilic maxim guiding Hitler was: “First, wage and win the war; then, reorganize Europe.” This maxim contradicted all the lessons of history, all the teachings of Europe’s greatest statesmen, particularly those of the Germans, like Frederick and Bismarck. It was Clausewitz who said war is only the extension of politics.

      in reply:
      “Europe” chose not to “reorganize” along NS lines, in part, I suspect, because Europe was still reeling from its “reorganization” following the devastating impact of World War 1, and the devastating impact of the First Great Depression.

      In time, it seems, the brightest and Whitest of Europe – the Scandinavian countries – DID, in fact, reorganize their economies along NS lines, while maintaining the Constitutional Monarchy framework from democratic processes.

      Where would YOU rather live, today, if you were starting out with a family?

      Detroit, in the victorious USA?

      Birmingham, in the victorious UK?

      Or a small country farm somewhere outside, say, Lillenhammer?

      Thought so.

      Drieu wrote:
      But even if one accepts Hitler’s maxim, the German dictator committed a number of military mistakes:

      1. Why did he wait six months between the Polish campaign and the French campaign?

      2. Why did he squander another ten months after the French campaign?

      3. Why in late 1940 did he wage a futile aerial assault on England, instead of striking the British Empire at its most accessible point, Gibraltar?

      After July 1940 [when no European power opposed him on the continent], he could have crossed Spain, destroyed the [English] naval base at Gibraltar, and closed off the Mediterranean.

      The armistice with Pétain [which led to the establishment of the Vichy regime] was [another] German disaster. If the French had followed [Paul] Reynaud [the last Premier of the Third Republic who advocated continued resistance from France’s North African colonies], the Germans would have been forced to do what was [militarily] necessary to win the war. For once master of Gibraltar, Hitler would have rendered [the English base at] Malta useless, avoided the Italian folly in the Balkans [which doomed Operation Barbarosa in Russia], and assured the possibility of an immediate and relatively uncostly campaign against [English occupied] Egypt. Rather than bombing London, he should, instead, have seized Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez. This would have settled the peace in the Balkans, avoiding the exhausting occupations of Greece and Yugoslavia, [it would have cut England off from her overseas empire, and guaranteed Europe’s Middle Eastern energy sources].

      in reply:
      There is an entire body of alternative history dealing, in whole or in part, with these issues. (One of the most interesting is Robert Blumetti’s “The Lion Is Humbled.”) Factually, Manstein deals with many of these issues in his book, “Lost Victories.”

      Drieu wrote:
      These military failings followed from Hitler’s total lack of imagination outside of Germany. He was [essentially] a German politician; good for Germany, but only there. Lacking political culture, education, and a larger tradition, having never traveled, being a xenophobe like many popular demagogues, he did not possess an understanding of what was necessary to make his strategy and diplomacy work outside Germany. All his dreams, all his talents, were devoted to winning the war of 1914, as if conditions [in 1940] were still those of 1914. . . He thus underestimated Russian developments and totally ignored American power, which had already made itself felt in 1914.

      in reply:
      No, Hitler was fully aware of these developments. They were openly discussed in the news, after all. He knew that he could do precious little about them, at any rate, until the time came to do what he could, where he was. For those who accuse him of lacking political culture, education, and a larger tradition, I advise you read “Mein Kampf,” and “Hitler’s Table Talk,” as well as “My New Order.”

      Hitler, like the best of us, was an autodidact.

      Incidentally, he recognized the importance of the development of educational institutions that rewarded meritocratic work, and created the NAPOLA system. These allowed talented students, regardless of their socioeconomic position, to have access – for free – at the same type of school system, and to the same standards, used by the Junkers in educating their sons and daughters. A very good movie depicting some of this experience is “Beyond The Fall.” Just overlook the obligatory parts that disparage the NSDAP Cultural Moment.

      And, I suspect his dreams and talents went well beyond winning the war of 1914.

      I suspect they included defining the foundation for a European superstate, to support a European homeland.

      Incidentally, speaking of “underestimating Russian developments,” I suspect that meant the size of the Russian army. In fact, everyone did this. Suvorov discusses the immense unseen power of the reserve system of the Russian army, and how it created “new” regiments literally overnight. (It is useful to recall that Zhukov, a military genius, spent TWO FULL YEARS with von Seeckt, perhaps the foremost military mind of the first half of the Twentieth Century, if not the entire Twentieth Century.)

      Drieu wrote:
      He did understand the importance of the tank and the airplane [whose military possibility came into their own after 1918], but not in relationship to the enormous industrial potential of Russia and America. He neglected [the role of] artillery, which was a step back from 1916-1918. He is least reproachable in his estimation of submarine warfare, whose significance was already evident in the Great War. But even here, the Anglo-Saxons [i.e., the Anglo-Americans] deployed their maritime genius in a way difficult for a European continental to anticipate.

      in reply:
      The “enormous industrial potential of Russia and America” WAS “the enormous industrial potential of America,” and American financing, as well.

      Hitler did not underestimate them; he literally could not do anything about them, given the instant situation. Remember, Stalin was moving ahead with all possible power in the direction of turning all of Europe into a Jewish vassal state, under (demonic!) Jewish-Communist control.

      Drieu wrote:
      Hitler’s political errors [, however,] were far worse and more thorough-going than his military errors. He hardly comprehended the problem, seeing it in terms of 1914 — in terms of diplomacy, national states, cabinet politics, and [rival] chancelleries. His understanding of Europe did not even measure up to that of old aristocrats like Bismarck and Wilhelm II, who never forgot the traditions of solidarity that united Europe’s dynasties, courts, and nobilities. . .

      in reply:
      The “traditions of solidarity” pretty much went by the wayside following The Guns of August.

      They were replaced by the “traditions” of financial dictatorships, masked by the Forms of “democracy.”

      We all know how that worked out…

      Drieu wrote:
      It is curious that this man who knew how to inspire the masses in his own country, who always maintained the closest contact with his people, never, not for a second, thought of extending his [successful] German policies to the rest of Europe. He [simply] did not understand the necessity of forging a policy to address Europe domestically and not just internationally. Diplomats and ambassadors had lost command of the stage — it was now in the hands of political leaders capable of winning the masses with the kind of social policies that had succeeded in Germany and could succeed elsewhere.

      Hitler didn’t understand this. After his armies invaded Poland, France, and elsewhere, he never thought of implementing the social and political practices that had worked in Germany . . . He never thought of carrying out policies that would have forged bonds of solidarity between the occupied and the occupiers. . .

      in reply:
      In fact, Hitler recognized that his policies could be extended to the rest of Europe, when the peoples of those countries had grown to the point where they could implement them, as organic developments arising from the people organically.

      Placing the National Socialist principles that have worked so well in Scandinavia in, say, Zimbabwe, would be like placing orchids in the desert. The basic material needed to sustain them is absent; the raw material needed to inspire their further development is not only absent, it is reviled…

      Drieu wrote:
      These failures lead me to suspect that the Germans’ political stupidity . . . owed something to fascism — that political and social system awkwardly situated between liberal democracy and Communist totalitarianism.

      In the fascist system there was something of the “juste milieu” that could not but lead to the Germans’ miserable failure. [A French term meaning a “golden mean” or a “happy medium,” “juste milieu” is historically associated with the moderate centrist politics (or anti-politics) of bourgeois constitutionalists — first exemplified by France’s July Monarchy (1830-48) and subsequently perfected in the American party system].

      The Germans have no political tradition. For centuries, most of them inhabited small principalities or cities where larger political forces had no part to play. There was, however, Vienna and Berlin. In these two capitals, politics was the province of a small [aristocratic] caste. The events of 1918 [i.e., the liberal revolutions that led to the Weimar and Viennese republics] abruptly dislodged this caste, severing its ties from the new governing class.

      Everything that has transpired in the last few years suggests that Germany remains what it was in the 18th century . . . a land unable to anchor its warrior virtues in politically sound principles . . .

      in reply:
      At THIS point, Drieu’s on drugs.

      Hitler saw the problem was to meld the warrior virtues with the mindset of the revolutionary, in the sense that the revolutionary would ruthlessly discuss the archaic Forms and use the raw materials in the development of a new Substance, to meet the new needs of the new cultural moment.

      Thus, Guderian, Schact, Rommel, and Speer, plucked from the System precisely because of their willingness to adopt new measures with revolutionary ruthlessness, and remarkable effectiveness.

      Drieu wrote:
      [Part of this is due to the fact that] the German is no psychologist. He is too much a theoretician, too intellectually speculative, for that. He lacks psychology in the way a mathematician or metaphysician does. German literature is rarely psychological; it develops ideas, not characters. The sole German psychologist is Nietzsche [and] he was basically one of a kind. . . Politically, the Germans [like the French] are less subtle and plastic than the English or the Russian, who have the best psychological literature and hence the best diplomacy and politics.

      in reply:
      Goethe.

      And, as for the idea that “the English or the Russian, (who) have the best psychological literature,” well, we can see what good THAT has done them.

      To paraphrase Goethe, “More Goethe.”

      Drieu wrote:
      Hitler’s behavior reflected the backward state of German, and beyond that, European attitudes. This son of an Austrian custom official inherited all the prejudices of his father’s generation (as had Napoleon). And like every German nationalist of Austrian extraction, he had an unshakable respect for the German Army and the Prussian aristocracy. Despite everything that disposed him against it, he remained the loyal Reichwehr agent he was in Munich [in 1919]. . . If he subsequently became a member of a socialist party [Anton Drexler’s German Workers’ Party] — of which he promptly became the leader — it was above all because this party was a nationalist one. Nationalism was always more important to him than socialism — even if his early years should have inclined him to think otherwise . . .

      in reply:
      It is a matter of historical fact that Hitler’s “unshakable respect for the German Army and the Prussian Aristocracy” never fell to the level of unquestioning respect.

      His willingness to reorder all aspects of the Germany army, as needed, as well as the financial and industrial systems, made him a revolutionary of the first order.

      As well, we have mentioned how he took the masterful private education system of the Junkers, and made it available to the best German students, for free…

      Drieu wrote:
      Like Mussolini, Hitler had no heartfelt commitment to socialism. [Drieu refers here not to the Semitic socialism of Marx, with its materialism, collectivism, and internationalism, but rather to the older European tradition of corporate socialism, which privileges the needs of family, community, and nation over those of the economy] . . . That’s why he so readily sacrificed the [socialist] dynamism of his movement for the sake of what the Wehrmacht aristocracy and the barons of heavy industry were willing to concede. He thought these alone would suffice in furnishing him with what was needed for his war of European conquest. . .

      Fascism failed to organize Europe because it was essentially a system of the “juste milieu” — a system
      seeking a middle way between communism and capitalism. . .

      Fascism failed because it did not become explicitly socialist. The narrowness of its nationalist base prevented it from becoming a European socialism . . . Action and reaction: On the one side, the weakness of Hitlerian and Mussolinian socialism prevented it from crossing national borders and becoming a European nationalism; on the other, the narrowness of Mussolinian and Hitlerian nationalism stifled its socialism, reducing it to a form of military statism. . .

      Source: Pierre Drieu La Rochelle. Textes retrouvées.
      Paris: Eds. du Rocher, 1992.

      in reply:
      Hitler, ever aware of the power of Culture, and RACE as the Living Bridge between Family and Culture, had “heartfelt commitment(s)” to what was best for the German people. This went so far as not allowing women to work in the war industries, despite the handicap this placed on war-time productivity, because the foundation of family was the invisible well from which Culture drank. Incidentally, Spotts,” writing in “Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics,” observed that Hitler exempted artists from war-time service.

      Socialism, as Drieu seems to define it, failed, because it did not develop as an organic response of the Nation to the issues facing the RACE of that Nation.

      I would argue Socialism DID develop, organically, as an organic response OF the Nation to the issues facing the RACE of that Nation in the Nation-States that were the most advanced, as homes of the most advanced RACE, the Scandinavian nations, home of the White RACE.

      But THAT Socialism, was a true National Socialism.

      And, above all, remember that Hitler tried to do the work of the hundred years in ten, while fighting an all-front war against his implacable RACIAL Enemies.

      Imagine what he could have done if other had been the case.

      Now, imagine what WE could do, in the analytical framework of a Northwest Republic, as our RACIAL Homeland.

      New America

      An Idea Whose Time Is HERE!