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Pipe Dreams of the "Reich": Romanticizing Nationalism in Germany
by Constantin von Hoffmeister
16 December 2003
This is the sort of modernity that made us ill, -- we grew sick on lazy
peace, cowardly compromise, the whole virtuous filth of the modern Yes and
No. -- Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist
After the defeat of the Napoleonic Empire, most Central European nations
embarked on a quest for sovereignty and freedom (from foreign oppressors).
This quest most often manifested itself in a pathological glorification of
one's own people, disregarding the fact that the propagators of this new
kind of nationalism implied that it was merely a common language that
constituted one's nation -- thereby completely disregarding or ignoring the
ethnic bonds various nations shared with each other (for example, Germany
and France -- both once ruled by one emperor, Charlemagne or Karl). This
kind of silliness certainly contributed a large amount of artificially
created (stirred up by self-proclaimed elitists within the respective
nations) hostility between once mutually tolerant European neighbors. One
could argue that the fratricidal war of 1914-1918 was a direct result of the
various European states' unchaining themselves from Napoleon's benevolent
yoke.
As Michael Stuermer writes in The German Empire, "Altogether, the
political and social revolutions of 1848 and the industrial revolution had
challenged the old established order of state and society" (23). Obviously,
this statement implies -- quite correctly -- that the so-called
"revolutionary" ("reactionary" would be a more adequate term, meaning that
the "new nationalists" tried to feed off the ideological chaos that was
unleashed by the French Revolution with its guillotine-terror) nationalist
movement in the German states was essentially nothing more than a
destructive outbreak of jingoistic emotions -- fueled by the fires of
perceived resentment against "stronger" and more unified neighbors (such as
France or Austria-Hungary). Naturally, one has to keep in mind that "the
shockwaves of the French Revolution and Napoleon" (Stuermer 23) were the
initial trigger moments in that all-pervasive European rebellion against the
established natural order of things (the term "natural" connoting
"traditional").
Matthew Levinger argues in Enlightened Nationalism that "numerous
historians have observed that bourgeois popular nationalism in
nineteenth-century Germany strongly emphasized the importance of collective
solidarity within the nation" (100). This quote sums up the quite ludicrous
notion that such an abstract concept as "collective solidarity" even existed
in a group that defined its cohesiveness on a purely linguistic base. One
has to keep in mind that language (as a concept) is flexible and far from
concrete -- some German dialects, such as "plattdeutsch" in the far north,
could even be considered closer to Dutch than High German. Basing a feeling
(intellectually concocted, no doubt) of mutual affection between members of
the same "nation" on their linguistic affinities seems therefore a bit
far-fetched.
Considering that most Germans were of the lower or middle classes of
society, it is not surprising that the Prussian King decided to ignore the
ignoble nationalist rants made at the Frankfurt Assembly in 1848. After
all, how could society not suffer with the implementation of the
revolutionaries' demands? European life had already deteriorated enough
through a series of bloody battles whose outcome was nothing less than a
complete re-organization of the continent in favor of the petty
(nationalist) forces that Napoleon (who triggered the martial campaigns in
first place) tried to dismantle by becoming undisputed ruler of Central
Europe. If the Prussian King had acquiesced and accepted the arrogant
demands of the petty rabble in Frankfurt, he would have opened the door to
all kinds of (essentially proto-Bolshevist) measures that would have been
implemented to undermine the divine authority of the crown and the blessed
rule of the various estates.
One of the measures that most (romantically inclined) nationalists in
Germany wanted to see installed was the equalization of all people in the
German-speaking realm under the autocratic rule of self-proclaimed
"representatives" of the people (in a parliament where the will of the
people was supposed to be represented). A prime example of this egalitarian
madness is Friedrich Ludwig Jahn's "Turner Gesellschaft." Levinger argues
that this movement "was intended to function as a public spectacle, as a
festival that would constitute the nation as a fraternity of equals" (107).
It goes without saying that Jahn's pipe-dream was just that -- a dream, or
maybe even a vision of megalomaniacal proportions (reflecting Jahn's own
aspirations, meaning his inflated sense of self-identification with the
ideal [both physically and mentally] "German," onto an entire people -- in
this case, the German "Volk," an organism that was supposed to be cohesive
and like-minded).
Stuermer exposes the lyrics of Hoffmann von Fallersleben's poem,
"Deutschland, Deutschland ueber alles" ("Germany, Germany above all"), for
what they really were -- namely, "pure German idealism: the idea that
Germany, an open and just society lubricated by Riesling [a fine wine,
really], full of song and beautiful German womanhood, should reign supreme
over the 38 or so sovereignties loosely united in the German Confederation..."
(16) What Stuermer forgets to mention is that this kind of "German
idealism" was the ideal breeding ground for an inverted sense of nationhood
-- the notion that the people, allegedly "equal" and ecstatic in an
alcohol-fuelled paradise, would happily cooperate in any task that was set
before them. In contrast, the traditional notion of a nation was based on
the ideal of a "universal hierarchy," meaning that people essentially were
NOT equal, and that they therefore deserved to be put in their naturally
assigned place (by birth).
Levinger argues that the world view of the romantic nationalists was deeply
entrenched in irrational religious fervor. He states that "rather than
articulating secular ideals, they presented an expressly Christian -- and
specifically Protestant pietist -- vision of the national community" (98).
This, of course, coincides with the argument that the German nationalists
were -- in essence -- nothing more than illusionists, obsessed with an
imagined "grande" idea and encouraged by their own pre-conceived notions of
Levantine spirituality. It is therefore quite obvious that the
nationalists' aspirations were diametrically opposed to the welfare of the
people as a whole. One cannot blame the nationalists for this faux pas,
however, since their belief system must have been rather deeply engrained.
Hence, one could argue that their failings were unintentional ones since
they were indoctrinated by society itself to believe that Christianity is
ideologically compatible with the German (or European) character.
On the other hand, Stuermer states that throughout "Europe the reaction to
Napoleon's conquest was to be the rise of modern nationalism as a means to
reconstitute society and to give expression to popular forces" (15). One
must wonder what exactly was "modern" about the rise of nationalism in
Germany when one reviews the backward nature of the revolutionaries'
outlook. The propagation of an alien religion (Christianity, essentially a
desert religion) certainly does not seem to be an adequate asset of
modernity. This kind of mentality breeds nothing but a reversal in the role
that civilization is usually ascribed to (an arbiter of progress). If the
romantic nationalists thought that the wholesale introduction of religious
fervor would breed sentimental sentiments regarding one's "Volk," they might
have been right, considering that the masses in Germany actually DID
subscribe to the religion that worships a (probably fictitious) man nailed
to a stick. It is only in hindsight that it becomes apparent that this kind
of nationalism was paving a one-way path to spiritual (in the
indigenous/European sense) annihilation, and therefore the soul of the
"Volk" was lured into a limbo of passive acceptance (of the status quo).
According to Levinger, "popular nationalism was an overwhelmingly urban
phenomenon" (100). This shows that the adherents of the nationalist
ideology were hardly in the position to speak for the German people as a
whole. After all, how could urban admonishers (as the nationalists
undoubtedly were) be in the position to speak for the majority that dwelt in
the countryside? The true/qualified propagandists of "blood and soil" could
only have been the ones that were agriculturally involved, but this segment
of society did not bother with the intellectual gymnastics that the
"educated" town-dwelling nationalists were preoccupied with.
It is safe to assume that the nationalist movement in Germany was nothing
more than an outbreak of the same kind of radical elements that the European
powers had such problems in dealing with after Robespierre cut off all those
heads (of the French elite). One does not need to take a huge leap in
trying to imagine what the world would look like today if the nationalists
had not succeeded in implementing their mad desire for "home rule."
As Stuermer says, "Both the French Revolution and the 'wars of liberation,'
as the uprising against Napoleon was called, gave a boost to revolutionary
idealism" (15). It is certainly fitting that Stuermer puts the "wars of
liberation" in quotation marks since the term itself exudes a significant
amount of irony. The real liberator of Europe was Napoleon, in the sense
that he tried to unite the continent and therefore make it indefinitely
stronger and eventually more just (with the ruthless implementation of the
Napoleonic Code). The "revolutionary idealists," however, were nothing but
a band of rascals that tried to cash in on the results of the failed
experiment of the once glorious French Emperor.
Bibliography
Levinger, Matthew. Enlightened Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002.
Stuermer, Michael. The German Empire. New York: Random House, 2000.
CONSTANTIN VON HOFFMEISTER
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