US 'closely involved' in Israel's attack on Lebanon
Sherwood Ross
Middle East Times
November 18, 2006
WASHINGTON — Even though it has strongly denied it, the Bush administration, notably Vice President Dick Cheney, was "closely involved" in the planning of Israel's invasion of Lebanon - planning that started well before Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers July 12.
In fact, the US told Israel it would be better to attack sooner than later so that the Pentagon has more time to learn from Israel's tactics to aid its own contemplated assault against Iran before Bush leaves office January, 2009.
According to several former and current US government officials, Elliott Abrams, a deputy national security advisor, and Cheney backed the Israeli plan, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh wrote in The New Yorker, an American magazine that closely tracks events in the Middle East. (A spokesman for Abrams denied his involvement.)
Both Bush and Cheney believed a successful Israeli aerial attack on Hezbollah's underground command-and-control centers in Lebanon "could ease Israel's security concerns and also serve as a prelude to a potential American preemptive attack to destroy Iran's nuclear installations, some of which are also buried deep underground," Hersh wrote. Cheney reportedly was enthusiastic about an opportunity to learn from Israel's attack for future US military operations against Iran.
As far back as spring, "under pressure from the White House to develop a war plan for a decisive strike against Iran's nuclear facilities," ranking US Air Force officials met with their Israeli counterparts. What's more, early last summer, before Hezbollah crossed into Israel to capture the two soldiers, Hersh wrote, several Israeli officials made separate visits to Washington "to get a green light for the bombing operation and to find out how much the United States would bear."
A consultant to the US government stated, "Israel began with Cheney. It wanted to be sure that it had his support and the support of his office and the Middle East desk of the
National Security Council," Hersh wrote. The Israelis outlined a major bombing campaign to start after the next Hezbollah provocation.
Israel believed that by targeting Lebanon's infrastructure, such as highways, fuel depots, bridges, and the Beirut airport, it could get Lebanon's Christian and Sunni populations to turn against Hezbollah, the magazine said. The plan was held to be "the mirror image of what the United States has been planning for Iran," a former senior intelligence official told Hersh.
US Army, Navy, and Marine Corps leaders are arguing a like plan against Iran carried out by the US Air Force will not work. They claim it will lead to sending in ground forces, just as the Israelis did in Lebanon.
Richard Armitage, deputy Secretary of State during Bush's first term, told Hersh: "If the most dominant military force in the region - the Israel Defense Forces - can't pacify a country like Lebanon, with a population of 4 million, you should think carefully about taking that template to Iran, with strategic depth and a population of 70 million." He added the only thing Israel's bombing accomplished was "to unite the population against the Israelis."
"The Israelis told us it would be a cheap war with many benefits," a US government consultant said to have close ties to Israel told Hersh. "Why oppose it? We'll be able to hunt down and bomb missiles, tunnels, and bunkers from the air. It would be a demo for Iran."
The New Yorker further reported that important intelligence being gathered by the US at White House insistence is being funneled "directly to the top" with little or no analysis by the National Security Agency in violation of its strictures. The source for this information, a Pentagon consultant, said Cheney "had a strong hand" in this development.
"The long-term administration goal was to help set up a Sunni Arab coalition - including countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt - that would join the United States and Europe to pressure the ruling Shiite mullahs in Iran," Hersh wrote. "But the thought behind that plan was that Israel would defeat Hezbollah, not lose to it," a consultant with close ties to Israel said.
One Middle East expert is quoted as saying Hezbollah's military showing "is a massive setback for those in the White House who want to use force in Iran. And those who argue that the bombing will create internal dissent and revolt in Iran are also set back."
"Strategic bombing has been a failed military concept for 90 years, and yet air forces all over the world keep on doing it," observed John Arquilla, a defense analyst at the Naval Postgraduate School. He told Hersh, "The warfare of today is not mass on mass. You have to hunt like a network to defeat a network. Israel focused on bombing against Hezbollah, and, when that did not work, it became more aggressive on the ground. The definition of insanity is continuing to do the same thing and expecting a different result."
The New Yorker article, "Watching Lebanon: Washington's interests in Israel's war," appeared in the August 21 issue.
Sherwood Ross is an American reporter and columnist. Reach him at sherwoodr1@yahoo.com
http://metimes.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20061118-110322-3073r
The Western democracy of today is the forerunner of Marxism which without it would not be thinkable. It provides this world plague with the culture in which its germs can spread.
-Adolf Hitler (Mein Kampf)
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/Iran/vf.htm
Vincent Ferraro, "A cease-fire won't get Israel what it wants," Newsday, 30 July 2006
In 1905, the German Army chief of staff, Alfred von Schlieffen, was given instructions to solve Germany's central strategic problem: its inability to win a simultaneous two-front war against France and Russia. His solution was simple and elegant: prepare Germany to fight a sequential two-front war, defeating the French in six weeks, before Russia could mobilize.
Israel seems to be pursuing a similar strategy today. With Egypt and Jordan having agreed to peace treaties, three external enemies remain: Iran, Syria and the Hezbollah militia. Hezbollah poses an immediate threat with its rockets; Iran is a longer-term threat because of its nuclear aspirations. But, using Syria as a conduit, Tehran also supplies Hezbollah with rockets and most of its financing.
More than the violence in Lebanon, Iran is Israel's greatest strategic threat, and eliminating that threat its highest strategic priority. The Bush administration, mired in Iraq, is concerned that Iran's regional power has been significantly enhanced by the election of a Shia-dominated Iraq government. All these fears are amplified by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran.
In December 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan described the emergence of a "Shia crescent" - a radical Islamic movement of Iran, Iraq (potentially), Syria and Hezbollah dedicated to destroying Israel and overthrowing Sunni Arab regimes that work with the West - Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait.
Interestingly, the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, refused to condemn Hezbollah at his press conference last week in Washington with President George W. Bush, raising the possibility the U.S. occupation actually has resulted in the creation of a powerful ally for Tehran.
From Iran's point of view, the lessons of Iraq, India and North Korea lead to one conclusion: Nuclear weapons are the only defense against an attack (Iraq), and penalties for developing nuclear weapons are manageable (India and North Korea).
With diplomatic efforts to denuclearize Iran having failed so far, it must be tempting for Israel to eliminate Iranian nuclear facilities. But because this would provoke a Hezbollah attack from Lebanon - and the prospect of a two-front war - Israel has been constrained.
When viewed from this perspective, Israel's attack in Lebanon against Hezbollah, totally disproportionate to the kidnapping of a handful of Israeli soldiers, becomes more comprehensible. The Israelis know the attack against Hezbollah is likely to result in temporary victory. The more permanent solution - occupation of southern Lebanon - is politically impossible given the disastrous results of the previous Israeli occupation.
A much discussed international peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon could make the Israeli offensive a permanent success, but any force that rooted out Hezbollah would be seen as an Israeli pawn and is highly unlikely to be implemented effectively.
If the long-term goal is to ensure a free hand against Iran, however, then the depletion of Hezbollah rockets, even with their attendant destruction of Israel, is a victory. From this perspective, U.S. opposition to an immediate cease-fire is comprehensible. The Bush administration wants Hezbollah destroyed, not just because it is a threat to Israel but because this helps any operation against Iran.
The willingness of the Sunni-dominated Arab governments in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to condemn the activities of Hezbollah presumably frees the United States from the fear of a monolithic Middle Eastern response to an attack against Iran: attacks against Israel, an oil embargo and a widespread flight of the oil-rich states from the U.S. Treasury market.
The costs of the Israeli operation in Lebanon are worthwhile if they purchase a defanged Iran. This does not mean a U.S.- backed Israeli attack against Iran is inevitable. The Israelis may not destroy Hezbollah in Lebanon; the Sunni-dominated Arab states may be overthrown by popular sentiment supporting Hezbollah; global supporters of Iran, particularly Russia and China who rely on Iran economically, may resist an attack.
But if the current offensive is designed mostly to stave off a two-front war, then it is useful to remember that the theoretical brilliance of the Schlieffen plan did not result in a strategic victory. Germany's ally, Austria, provoked the war, and Russia started to mobilize before Germany was ready. War plans rarely survive reality, and in Schlieffen's case, led to the greatest military tragedy of modern times: World War I.